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THE CONTENT  
OF CONFRONTATION 
LISA KERN GRIFFIN* 
ABSTRACT 
This piece comments on the state of the Supreme Court’s 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence at the close of the October 2010 
Term. The 2004 Crawford v. Washington decision established that 
criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to cross examine 
witnesses whose testimonial out-of-court statements are introduced into 
evidence. The seemingly categorical quality of that precedent is called 
into question by the Court’s reasoning in Michigan v. Bryant. The 
Court appears to have come full circle since Crawford: Bryant suggests 
that an out-of-court statement is admissible even absent confrontation 
if a multi-factor balancing test verifies its reliability. That inquiry 
closely resembles the Ohio v. Roberts framework that Crawford 
purportedly overruled, and the Bryant decision leaves lower courts with 
an open-textured analysis once again. The Court has all but held that 
the Confrontation Clause applies if an out-of-court statement provides 
the sort of evidence that implicates the Confrontation Clause. One way 
out of that loop might be to look more closely at the content of the right 
to confrontation, which the Court equates with cross examination. 
Focusing on the undertheorized role of cross examination itself—
including the extent to which it has any potential to ensure reliability—
could clarify when the right applies and address open questions about 
what confrontation requires as well. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions on the Confrontation 
Clause focus on the admissibility of out-of-court statements, or 
hearsay declarations, that inculpate criminal defendants. In order to 
satisfy the right to confrontation, the Court has concluded that 
witnesses who make “testimonial” hearsay statements must be subject 
to cross examination. The 2004 Crawford v. Washington1 decision 
purportedly introduced this categorical approach, but it has proven 
difficult to determine which statements meet the definition of 
“testimonial” and thus require confrontation. The shift from a 
construction of the confrontation right grounded in substantive 
reliability concerns to a focus on its procedural guarantees at first 
appeared marked. Yet with each iteration of Crawford’s meaning, the 
essential claims in different opinions sound increasingly similar. 
Despite surface distinctions, the decisions reveal underlying 
agreement about the epistemic aspirations of confrontation and about 
the sole means to achieve them: cross examination. Accordingly, as 
one approach to the remaining questions about the definition of 
testimonial, the Court might consider the potential utility of cross 
examination. Attention to the undertheorized question of what cross 
examination actually accomplishes at trial could also ensure that the 
right to confrontation has some force when it applies. 
II. “WITNESSES AGAINST” 
The Sixth Amendment provides that “in all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him.”2 Although the rules of evidence exclude many 
statements made by out-of-court declarants, they also provide for 
numerous exceptions to that rule, grounded in the necessity or 
reliability of hearsay evidence.3 Read literally, the Confrontation 
Clause would preclude any hearsay declarants from serving as 
“witnesses against” a criminal defendant, absent confrontation. The 
Confrontation Clause does not, however, impose an absolute bar to 
hearsay, and the Court has long recognized that some hearsay is 
admissible against criminal defendants.4 
 
 1.  541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
 2.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 3.  See FED. R. EVID. 801–04.  
 4.  See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980). 
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A. Overlap between the Hearsay Prohibition and the Confrontation 
Right 
A central conflict in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence is 
whether the same accuracy concerns that animate the hearsay 
prohibition and its exceptions also provide the rationale for the 
Confrontation Clause, and thus help determine when the 
constitutional protection applies. The Court’s first systematic effort to 
reconcile hearsay exceptions with the Confrontation Clause’s 
requirements yielded largely coextensive treatment of the hearsay 
prohibition and constitutionally mandated exclusion. Beginning with 
Ohio v. Roberts5 in 1980, the Court spent a quarter century refining 
the idea that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to 
confront witnesses applies only where the prior statement does not 
bear sufficient indicia of reliability.6 Under Roberts and its progeny, 
two signals of reliability emerged: a statement’s fit within a firmly 
rooted hearsay exception and its “particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.”7 As the Court proceeded to hold most hearsay 
exceptions “firmly rooted,” the Confrontation Clause added little 
force to the hearsay prohibition.8 Where the Court did examine the 
trustworthiness of a statement more broadly, it focused on the context 
in which the statement was produced and considered factors such as 
the level of spontaneity and the speaker’s likely motivations.9 
In a series of cases beginning with Crawford v. Washington in 2004, 
the Supreme Court “reconstitutionalized” the right to confrontation. 
Writing for the Court in Crawford, Justice Scalia declared reliability 
“an amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept” and rejected it as a 
touchstone for application of the right to confrontation.10 He later 
 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. at 66; see also United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 
805 (1990); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992); Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999).   
 7.  Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
 8.  Only the residual, “catch-all” hearsay exception and an accomplice’s custodial 
confessions were excluded from the category of “firmly rooted” exceptions. See Lilly, 527 U.S. 
at 134; Wright, 497 U.S. at 817.  
 9.  See Wright, 497 U.S. at 806. 
 10.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61, 67–68 (2004) (emphasizing that 
confrontation is a procedural right animated by concerns apart from the accuracy of the trial’s 
outcome). The most persistent champion of the Confrontation Clause’s disentanglement from 
hearsay doctrine has been Richard Friedman. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: 
The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1027–29 (1998) (arguing that the 
confrontation right does not arise from reliability concerns); Richard D. Friedman, The 
Confrontation Right Across the Systemic Divide, in CRIME, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN A 
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR MIRJAN 
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amplified his objection that the Roberts regime allowed the Court to 
“create the exceptions that it thinks consistent with the policies 
underlying the confrontation guarantee, regardless of how that 
guarantee was historically understood.”11 According to the textual and 
historical reasoning in Crawford, the confrontation right arises from 
the nature, rather than the quality, of the out-of-court statement. The 
term “witness” in the Confrontation Clause, the Court concluded, 
reaches any out-of-court declarant whose statement constitutes 
“testimony.”12 All testimonial statements, then, are barred by the 
Confrontation Clause unless the out-of-court declarant is present for 
cross examination at the criminal trial, or unavailable and subject to a 
prior opportunity for cross examination.13 Although the Crawford 
Court did not define “testimonial,” it explained that the term at least 
covered responses to police interrogations and other assertions that 
amount to prior testimony, including statements at a preliminary 
hearing, before a grand jury, or at a formal trial.14 
B. Circularity in the Meaning of Testimonial 
The stated goal of the Crawford decision was to fashion a more 
“categorical” guarantee of confrontation.15 But the failure to put any 
hard edges on the meaning of “testimonial,” beyond identifying the 
obvious substitutes for trial testimony, led almost immediately to its 
dilution. The Court concluded, for example, that a laboratory analyst’s 
affidavit certifying that a substance is cocaine engages the 
confrontation guarantee because its sole purpose is to establish the 
identity of the substance in court.16 Once courts tried to use the 
Crawford “rule” in off-brand situations that do not have labels like 
affidavits, however, the inquiry acquired an open texture. 
Davis v. Washington,17 decided in 2006, first exposed the lack of 
precision in the Crawford formula. In Davis, the Court confronted 911 
calls and police questioning in the domestic violence context, 
endeavoring to categorize statements that do not resemble trial 
 
DAMAŠKA 266 (John Jackson, Máximo Langer & Peter Tillers eds., 2008) (applauding 
Crawford because it “detached the meaning of the Clause from the hearsay rule”). 
 11.  See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 374 (2008). 
 12.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
 13.  Id. at 68.  
 14.  Id. 
 15.  See id. at 67–68.  
 16.  Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009). 
 17.  547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
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testimony but can inculpate defendants to the same extent.18 The 
Court held that statements are testimonial when their “primary 
purpose” is to “establish or prove past events potentially relevant to 
later criminal prosecution.”19 Statements are nontestimonial when 
made “under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary 
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an 
ongoing emergency.”20 
Divining the “purpose” of a statement—as the Michigan v. 
Bryant21 decision illustrates—ends up looking a great deal like the 
Roberts determination as to whether a statement was sufficiently 
reliable to forgo confrontation. Bryant involved statements made by a 
shooting victim as he lay bleeding on the pavement of a Detroit gas 
station.22 Police were dispatched to the scene at 3:25 AM, and five 
officers responded.23 When they arrived at the gas station, they asked 
the victim “what happened.”24 The victim indicated that he had been 
shot half an hour before, and officers summoned emergency medical 
assistance.25 Meanwhile, police continued questioning him about the 
details of the shooting until paramedics arrived a few minutes later.26 
When they asked the victim who shot him, he named “Rick” (Bryant) 
as the gunman and gave officers the location of the incident, which 
was six blocks away.27 The victim died shortly thereafter at a hospital, 
and his statements were admitted at Bryant’s murder trial.28 
Justice Sotomayor, writing for the Bryant majority, concluded that 
the statements were not a “substitute for trial testimony,” but rather a 
response to an ongoing emergency involving a “victim found in a 
public location, suffering from a fatal gunshot wound, and a 
perpetrator whose location was unknown at the time the police 
located the victim.”29 The Court asserted that it was applying an 
objective approach, based on the totality of the circumstances, to 
determine whether the victim’s statement was the functional 
 
 18.  Id. at 817–19. 
 19.  Id. at 822.  
 20.  Id. 
 21.  131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).  
 22.  Id. at 1150. 
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id.  
 25.  Id.  
 26.  Id.  
 27.  Id. at 1150, 1170. 
 28.  Id. at 1150. 
 29.  Id. at 1156. 
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equivalent of testimony.30 Davis also purported to articulate an 
objective test, yet the factors that Davis and Bryant offer the lower 
courts as a guide to determining whether a statement is testimonial 
import a high degree of subjectivity and leave judges with broad 
discretion. Among the considerations—many of which could point to 
opposite conclusions—are the nature and timing of the questions, the 
lapse of time between the incident described and the statement, the 
declarant’s use of the present or past tense, the location of the 
encounter that produces the statement, the formality of the 
interrogation, whether a violent crime is at issue, whether a gun or 
other weapon is involved, and the physical and emotional condition of 
the declarant.31 
Justice Scalia authored the Davis opinion, which instituted most of 
these factors, but vigorously dissented from Bryant because of an 
additional (and familiar) consideration that surfaced in that case: 
whether the statement would be admissible pursuant to the “standard 
rules of hearsay, designed to identify some statements as reliable.”32 
That factor reintroduces the connection between the reliability 
principles in the hearsay rules and the scope of the Confrontation 
Clause right. The majority noted that the reliability-based hearsay 
exceptions “rest on the belief that certain statements are, by their 
nature, made for a purpose other than use in a prosecution and 
therefore should not be barred by hearsay prohibitions.”33 The Court 
cited, for example, the logic underlying the excited utterance 
exception to the hearsay rule: that one does not formulate falsehoods 
in a state of agitation.34 The Bryant opinion also conflated the theory 
behind hearsay exceptions with the evolving definition of 
“testimonial.” According to the Court’s reasoning, the rationale for 
Davis’s primary-purpose test is that “the prospect of fabrication in 
statements given for the primary purpose of resolving [an] emergency 
is presumably significantly diminished, [and] the Confrontation 
Clause does not require such statements to be subject to the crucible 
of cross-examination.”35 
 
 30.  Id.   
 31.  See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830–32 (2006); Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1158–59, 
1162–66; see also id. at 1162 (the assessment of whether a statement is testimonial accounts for 
“all relevant circumstances”). 
 32.  Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1174. 
 33.  Id. at 1157 n.9 (citing hearsay exceptions). 
 34.  Id. at 1162 n.12. 
 35.  Id. at 1157 n.9.  
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Justice Scalia’s critique of the Bryant Court’s “unprincipled” 
analysis has some force, but the Bryant decision brings several 
passages from Crawford itself to mind.36 In Crawford, Justice Scalia 
argued that the divergent lower court opinions on the applicability of 
the Confrontation Clause provided a “self-contained demonstration” 
of the flaws in the Roberts framework.37 The Supreme Court’s own 
range of opinions in Bryant similarly underscores the ill-defined 
boundaries of testimonial statements and the mutability of the 
Crawford standard. Bryant conveys the sense that, in most 
circumstances, the factors the Court articulated could be applied in an 
outcome-driven way. The majority and dissenting opinions express 
disagreement in part about extending the Davis standard, but more 
broadly about the interpretation of the facts.38 Looking at the same 
raw data, the Justices simply differed about how best to characterize 
the purpose of either the police questioning or the victim’s statement. 
The multi-factor balancing test that emerges from Davis turns out to 
be every bit as discretionary as the Roberts scheme, and the salience 
of the victim’s statement combined with the seriousness of the murder 
prosecution appear to have weighed on the majority.39 
On the surface, Bryant may do little to change the Crawford 
framework, but it does highlight the shortcomings of Crawford and its 
extensions. It seems that the more effort the Court makes to clarify 
the meaning of “testimonial,” the cloudier the picture becomes. There 
may be inconsistent interpretations of a declarant’s intent, just as 
conclusions differed as to a statement’s reliability. The aim of any 
statement is difficult to isolate and discern, whether the trial courts 
focus on the primary purpose of the declarant, of the statement, or of 
the interrogation as a whole. Indeed, the entire “emergency response” 
doctrine can be explained “as much as an exception to the 
inadmissibility of testimonial statements as a limit on the scope of the 
category.”40 It is simply not the case that in every emergency, “the 
speaker and hearer [will] be more concerned about resolving the 
emergency than with gathering statements for use in prosecution,” or 
that they would have said the same thing “even if there were no 
 
 36.  Id. at 1175 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004). 
 37.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 66.  
 38.  See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1170–72 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 39.  See id. at 1170 (“If the defendant ‘deserves’ to go to jail, then a court can focus on 
whatever perspective is necessary to declare damning hearsay nontestimonial.”).  
 40.  Michael S. Pardo, Testimony, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1, 57 (2007).  
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prosecution forthcoming.”41 Similarly, a witness may make statements 
to assist criminal prosecutions that describe past, present, or future 
events.42 Instead of offering real guidance and imposing meaningful 
limitations, those factors have become discretionary points of entry 
for judges assessing how valuable lost evidence—particularly the 
statements of now-silenced victims—would be. 
Justice Scalia’s own reformulation of the Davis test in his Bryant 
dissent focuses on the declarant’s intent alone, but otherwise provides 
a definition of “testimonial” that is equally circular and just as likely 
to produce inconsistent results. A testimonial statement, he writes, is 
one made with “the understanding that [the statement] may be used 
to invoke the coercive machinery of the State against the accused.”43 
According to Justice Scalia’s reasoning, a purposive test differs from a 
reliability-based test because weaker substitutes for live testimony 
may or may not be reliable.44 True, but Justice Scalia has also 
repeatedly said that weaker substitutes for live testimony are the 
appropriate focus of the Confrontation Clause precisely because it is 
those statements that require reliability testing. 
A second Confrontation Clause decision from the October 2010 
Term, Bullcoming v. New Mexico,45 sounded a similar note about the 
aim of the testimonial category. In Bullcoming, the Court held that 
the prosecution may not introduce forensic laboratory reports 
through the in-court testimony of analysts who did not certify the 
results or personally observe the tests.46 Bullcoming was in many ways 
an unsurprising application of the Court’s holding in Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts47—that certificates of analysis from a state forensic 
laboratory are “affirmation[s] made for the purpose of establishing or 
proving some fact” and therefore testimonial.48 Bullcoming offers 
further evidence, however, of both the core dispute about the 
significance of reliability, and the futility of resolving it through the 
definition of “testimonial.” Although Justice Ginsburg’s opinion 
asserts that reliability tells us nothing about whether a statement is 
 
 41.  Id.  
 42.  Id. at 56 (giving the example that “[a] speaker who tells the police his neighbor just 
finished selling drugs, is currently selling drugs, or will be selling drugs in one hour is offering a 
testimonial statement in all three instances”).    
 43.  Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1169 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 44.  Id. at 1175.  
 45.  131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
 46.  Id. at 2713.  
 47.  129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
 48.  Id. at 2532. 
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testimonial, it does acknowledge that testimonial statements are those 
that require scrutiny of their reliability.49 Justice Sotomayor’s 
concurrence responds to characterizations of the Bryant opinion and 
explains that reliability remains “relevant” but is not “essential.”50 In 
Justice Kennedy’s dissent, he objects to the Court’s rejection of 
“reliability [as] a legitimate concern” and insists that statements could 
“provide sufficient indicia of reliability and other safeguards to 
comply with the Confrontation Clause as it should be understood.”51 
Although these formulations illustrate continuing disagreement 
about the role of reliability in determining when the Confrontation 
Clause applies, they uniformly cite the testing of evidence for 
accuracy as the reason why it should. There is no dispute that the 
Clause applies in order to ensure a certain level of epistemic 
competence at trial. Having demonstrated that a test focused on the 
purpose of the declarant can produce results as inconsistent as a 
reliability inquiry, the Court should perhaps begin to account for the 
purpose of confrontation instead. Future applications of Crawford 
could work backwards from the utility of confrontation and apply a 
content-driven standard to clarify the category of out-of-court 
statements that merit testimonial treatment. 
III. “TO CONFRONT” 
If the Court is to find common ground, or even maintain a stable 
majority for any approach to the post-Crawford Confrontation 
Clause, it may need to use a different lens to evaluate whether 
hearsay implicates the “Sixth Amendment’s core concerns.”52 Efforts 
to define which hearsay declarants are “witnesses against” the 
defendant have not produced consistent results, and looking instead 
to what it means “to confront” a hearsay declarant could prove more 
fruitful. The Court agrees, after all, that testimonial statements are 
those that should be tested through a particular kind of reliability 
guarantee. Confrontation, Justice Scalia wrote in Crawford, is “the 
only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional 
demands.”53 Justice Scalia made a similar statement in his dissenting 
 
 49.  Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715. 
 50.  Id. at 2720 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 51.  Id. at 2725, 2727 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 52.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).  
 53.  Id. at 69.  
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opinion in Maryland v. Craig,54 where he asserted that the 
Confrontation Clause “guarantees specific trial procedures that were 
thought to assure reliable evidence.”55 The Court has repeatedly 
stated that those procedures refer to cross examination of accusing 
witnesses.56 As the Bryant Court affirmed, the “basic objective” of the 
Confrontation Clause is to safeguard the “opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant about statements taken for use at trial.”57 
A. An Intertwined Substantive and Procedural Guarantee 
This piece suggests that one way out of the interpretive difficulties 
with the testimonial concept might be to ask when cross examination 
serves the purposes of confrontation. As David Sklansky argues, 
inconsistencies in the Court’s jurisprudence on the Confrontation 
Clause arise in part from the failure to consider its underlying goals 
and identify those cases in which applying the right can make a 
“functional difference.”58 In other words, in order to identify which 
out-of-court statements are improper substitutes for live testimony, 
the Court might give fuller consideration to the potential that cross 
examination has to test those statements in court. That idea, only 
briefly explored here, requires further work on implementation. It 
also risks running afoul of Justice Scalia’s rigorous distinction 
between procedural and substantive guarantees of reliability.59 There 
is a close relationship, however, between the procedural means and 
the substantive, epistemic ends.60 Confrontation protects against 
 
 54.  497 U.S. 836 (1990). 
 55.  See id. at 862.  
 56.  See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (the appearance of a declarant who 
testifies at trial about the prior hearsay statement vindicates the right to confrontation, as does a 
prior opportunity to cross examine an unavailable declarant); see also Bruton v. United States, 
391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 241–42 (1895); David Alan 
Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1644–45 (2009) (stating that the 
meaning of confrontation—“cross-examination of prosecution witnesses by defense counsel in 
front of the jury”—has been settled for decades). 
 57.  Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011). 
 58.  See Sklansky, supra note 56, at 1655–56; see also David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last 
Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 49 (discussing the approach often termed “liberal originalism,” 
which considers the harms a constitutional provision seeks to prevent and asks “how we can 
best be faithful to those purposes today”); cf. Jeffrey L. Fisher, What Happened—and What Is 
Happening—To the Confrontation Clause?, 15 J. L. & POL’Y 587, 626 (2007) (“[T]he 
confrontation right needs to be protected with doctrine that reflects confrontation values.”). 
 59.  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (explaining that the Confrontation 
Clause “commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular 
manner”). 
 60.  By way of contrast, the Fifth Amendment protection against compelled testimonial 
self-incrimination is a hybrid. Coercive interrogation techniques can produce false confessions, 
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abuses of government power,61 but its specific concern is those abuses 
that produce inaccuracies. The “principal evil” at which the 
Confrontation Clause was directed, according to the Court in 
Crawford, “was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and 
particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the 
accused.”62 The Justices may differ on the weight of potential 
government manipulation of evidence versus more general reliability 
issues,63 but they share a “concern for the accuracy of the truth-
determining process in criminal trials.”64 The “abhorrence” of ex parte 
affidavits, for example, arises from apprehension about their 
trustworthiness.65 “The danger is that innocent defendants may be 
convicted on the basis of unreliable, untested statements by those who 
observed—or claimed to have observed—preparation for or 
commission of the crime.”66 
Given the objectives of the Confrontation Clause, courts should 
apply it in those cases where cross examination has the potential to 
reveal a declarant’s calculation or error. Much of that potential can be 
assessed ex ante through the substance, rather than the circumstances, 
of the out-of-court statement. One problem with the test that has 
divided the Court is that “primary purpose”—“why” a declarant 
made a statement (or the purpose an investigator had in questioning 
her)—is not easily identified.67 But the content of a statement—what 
 
but they also violate extra-epistemic values. The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on 
unreasonable searches and seizures is purely procedural. An illegal search may yield highly 
reliable evidence, such as a stash house full of narcotics, but privacy and liberty concerns 
nonetheless require its exclusion from trial. 
 61.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7 (“Involvement of government officers in the production 
of testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse—a fact 
borne out time and again throughout a history with which the Framers were keenly familiar.”). 
Of course, the Court’s claims about the historical origins of the Confrontation Clause are 
themselves contested. See id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“The Court’s 
distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial statements, contrary to its claim, is no better 
rooted in history than our current doctrine.”); see also generally Thomas Y. Davies, What Did 
the Framers Know and When Did They Know It?: Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. 
Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2005). 
 62.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50. 
 63.  That distinction is apparent in the debate about whether the declarant’s or the 
questioner’s intent controls in the “primary purpose” test. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 
24, Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) (No. 09-150). 
 64.  Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970). 
 65.  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 48–50 (written evidence taken ex parte “very seldom leads to 
the proper discovery of the truth”). 
 66.  Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
 67.  See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 839 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[P]rimacy 
requires constructing a hierarchy of purpose that will rarely be present—and is not reliably 
discernible.”). 
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it conveys—lies closer to the surface. That content, including the 
extent to which it makes or amplifies an accusation, and whether it 
concerns the fault or identity of a perpetrator, could help determine 
whether a declarant is bearing witness within the meaning of the 
Confrontation Clause. 
B. Cross Examination in Theory and Practice 
Any assessment of whether a statement lends itself to useful 
dissection through cross examination requires some reflection on how 
cross examination supposedly establishes reliability. In theory, cross 
examination accomplishes three things: perjury prevention, error 
identification, and some vindication of dignity interests. Perhaps the 
most consistent justification for its centrality in confrontation 
jurisprudence is that it prevents perjury.68 Cross examination has been 
widely touted as the “greatest legal engine ever invented for the 
discovery of truth.”69 It is also theorized as a method for exposing 
errors.70 False testimony, of course, does not always arise from outright 
dishonesty or even susceptibility to manipulation. The hearsay 
dangers include inaccurate perception, memory, or description of 
what occurred,71 and adversarial questioning can detect those errors. 
Cross examination works as counter narrative as well; it “dramatizes 
for the jury not only that there are two stories to tell about most 
events, but also that there is always a discontinuity between any event 
and even the best telling of it.”72 
 
 68.  See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2009) (stating that a 
forensic analyst “who provides false results may, under oath in open court, reconsider his false 
testimony”). 
 69.  5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367, at 32 
(James H. Chadbourne ed., 1974); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Worst Evidence 
Principle: The Best Hypothesis as to the Logical Structure of Evidence Law, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
1069, 1072 (1992) (discussing the primary concerns of evidence law and identifying the 
prevention of witness perjury as the core). 
 70.  See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2537 (“Confrontation is designed to weed out 
not only the fraudulent analyst but the incompetent one as well.”). 
 71.  See Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay 
Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 188 (1948) (“[C]ross examination can and does reveal . . . 
peculiarities in the use of language . . . [and] expose[s] faults in perception and memory.”); see 
also Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1339, 1341 (1987) 
(accuracy is maximized if the jury has “more information about the specific circumstances 
affecting [the declarant’s] perception and memory of the events”); cf. ROBERT P. BURNS, THE 
DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 19 (2009) (“The assumption underlying cross-examination is 
that the witness has chosen to cut into the great booming, buzzing confusion of life in a way that 
is consciously or unconsciously willful, that he or she has left out something important that 
changes the meaning of everything.”). 
 72.  BURNS, supra note 71, at 17. 
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These theories have force, but the effect of cross examination in 
practice is largely an “article of faith”;73 it has rarely received critical 
evaluation, and there is little empirical evidence on its efficacy.74 Cross 
examination is basically a “blunt instrument,” and only a “hit-or-miss 
safeguard against the truth-bending and truth-concealing effects of 
placing partisans in charge of the production and presentation of the 
evidence.”75 Even John Henry Wigmore—who gave cross examination 
that notorious endorsement as the “greatest engine” for discovering 
truth—acknowledged that it can be manipulated to create false 
impressions with partial truths.76 The extant psychological studies, 
moreover, suggest that cross examination has only limited utility as a 
tool for identifying error and falsehood.77 Criminal procedure 
doctrine generally has incorporated empirical data and the insights of 
social science at a glacial pace.78 But the comparatively new and still-
evolving right recognized in Crawford could be informed by current 
research on the function of cross examination, which suggests that 
 
 73.  See Richard O. Lempert, Built on Lies: Preliminary Reflections on Evidence Law as an 
Autopoietic System, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 343, 345 (1998) (“[T]he likely effectiveness of cross-
examination in getting at the truth is seldom examined—numerous court opinions and 
commentaries rely on Wigmore’s conclusion . . . rather than on empirical evidence.”). 
 74.  See, e.g., Roger C. Park, Adversarial Influences on the Interrogation of Trial Witnesses, 
in ADVERSARIAL VERSUS INQUISITORIAL JUSTICE 131 (Peter J. Van Koppen & Steven D. 
Penrod eds., 2003). 
 75.  JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF THE ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 270 (2003). 
 76.  JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, SELECT CASES ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 3 (2d ed. 1913) 
(cross examination, although “the most efficacious expedient ever invented for the extraction of 
truth,” may be “almost equally powerful for the creation of false impressions”); WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS, supra note 69, § 1367, at 32 (adversaries can “make the truth appear like 
falsehood” and “do anything [they want] with cross examination”). 
 77.  H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing Through 
the Liar’s Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 787–88 (1993) (stating that repeated experiments have 
documented that observing nonverbal behavior does little to reveal lying and that “we can 
hardly afford to ignore the cumulative conclusion, painful as it may be to some cherished 
assumptions of the process”). 
 78.  See Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 
2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 155 (noting the “ever-widening gap between Fourth Amendment 
consent jurisprudence, on the one hand, and scientific findings about the psychology of 
compliance and consent on the other”); cf. John E.B. Myers, et al., Hearsay Exceptions: 
Adjusting the Ratio of Intuition to Psychological Science, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 3, 8 
(2002) (the idea that “trauma momentarily stills the capacity or motivation to lie” is 
“unsupported by empirical evidence”). For one context in which social science and legal 
standards are beginning to align, consider the increasing use of hearings to determine the 
reliability of eyewitness identifications and instructions to jurors on the influences that heighten 
the risk of misidentification. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, In New Jersey, Rules Are Changed on 
Witness IDs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2011, at A1. Courts have cited recent social science on 
mistaken identifications and empirical research documenting that eyewitness misidentifications 
are the leading cause of wrongful convictions. See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT: 
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 45–83 (2011). 
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cross examination does less work than the Court assumes. In some 
cases, the opportunity to test the substance of a prior statement and 
compare it with in-court testimony could broadly impact reliability. In 
others, the observation of a live witness may serve only as a 
distraction. 
Consistency between statements can indicate truthfulness, but it 
turns out that demeanor and confidence provide few cues to 
deception.79 One researcher, for example, consulted judges on the 
standards by which jurors are asked to assess credence and found that 
“internal inconsistency and external contradictions” rated at the top 
of the scale.80 Other experiments indicate that mock jurors can 
distinguish between direct testimony from eye witnesses and hearsay 
declarations, even without the opportunity to observe that distinction, 
and can weigh the evidence appropriately.81 Moreover, recent 
empirical work challenges the idea that there are “universal behaviors 
that reveal deceit”; if liars exhibit demeanor cues, “they do so in many 
diverse and barely perceptible ways.”82 Nonverbal signals may actually 
mislead. The level of confidence and certainty that eye witnesses 
display, for example, enhances jurors’ assessments of their credibility, 
but does not correlate with the accuracy of their identifications.83 
Simply put, experimental data suggests that “ordinary observers do 
not benefit from the opportunity to observe nonverbal behavior in 
judging whether someone is lying.”84 
 
 79.  See Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence, Procedure, and the Upside of Cognitive Error, 
57 STAN. L. REV. 291, 335 (2004); see also Chris William Sanchirico, “What Makes the Engine 
Go?” Cognitive Limitations and Cross-Examination, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 507, 514–15 (2009) 
(“Cognitive limitations imply that the task of presenting consistent, detailed, and robust 
testimony draws a much heavier cognitive load for the fabricating witness than for the witness 
who honestly recounts her actual memories.”); Aldert Vrij, et al., Outsmarting the Liars: The 
Benefit of Asking Unanticipated Questions, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 164 (2009) 
(“[C]ompared to truth tellers, liars gave relatively inconsistent answers to the unanticipated 
questions.”). 
 80.  See Uviller, supra note 77, at 825.  
 81.  See, e.g., Peter Miene, Roger C. Park & Eugene Borgida, Juror Decision Making and 
the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 683, 691–92 (1992). 
 82.  Dan Simon, The Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64 VAND. L. REV. 143, 176–
77 (2011). 
 83.  Id. at 157–58 (summarizing the experimental research on witness confidence); see also 
Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 80–81 (2008). 
 84.  Olin Guy Wellborn, III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1088 (1991); id. at 1091 
(“Transcripts are probably superior to live testimony as a basis for credibility judgments 
because they eliminate distracting, misleading, and unreliable nonverbal data and enhance the 
most reliable data, verbal content.”); see also Charles F. Bond, Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo, 
Individual Differences in Judging Deception: Accuracy and Bias, 134 PSYCHOL. BULL. 477, 483 
(2007) (detection of testimonial accuracy in experimental subjects was not appreciably higher 
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Recognizing the substantive limitations of pure presence in the 
courtroom might encounter some resistance, in part because there is a 
third dimension to cross examination: the relationship between live 
testimony and intrinsic interests in both solemnity and fair play.85 
Confrontation primarily addresses accuracy concerns, but it also 
serves to “accord[] the defendant a degree of dignity, allowing him 
some agency in the adjudication process and treating his input and his 
objections as worthy of respect.”86 There is also a popular culture of 
cross examination—in legal thrillers and media accounts of high-
profile trials—that treats it as the central plot point in the courtroom 
drama. The folklore of the adversarial trial privileges resolution 
through conflict, and cross examination fulfills expectations for some 
verbal skirmishes.87 Various cases cite this performative aspect of live 
confrontation.88 In United States v. Yates,89 for example, the Eleventh 
Circuit found live, two-way video conferencing with overseas 
witnesses insufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause because it 
lacked the “intangible elements of the ordeal of testifying.”90 Physical 
presence can serve important expressive functions, but as discussed 
here, the essential purposes of confrontation are analytic ones, and the 
substantive interaction between prior statements and current 
testimony produces information that speaks more directly to those 
concerns. 
IV. EPISTEMIC COMPETENCE  
AND REMAINING QUESTIONS ABOUT CRAWFORD 
While the scope of confrontation extends beyond the hearsay 
rules, it also makes sense to design its reach in keeping with epistemic 
 
than what would occur by chance); Saul M. Kassin, Human Judges of Truth, Deception, and 
Credibility: Confident but Erroneous, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 809, 809–10 (2002) (same). 
 85.  See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST 
PRINCIPLES 90 (1997) (citing the fairness rationales for confrontation); cf. Raymond LaMagna, 
Note, (Re)Constitutionalizing Confrontation: Reexamining the Unavailability and the Value of 
Live Testimony, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1499, 1502–05 (2006) (arguing that the right cannot be 
vindicated by prior opportunities for cross examination and requires live testimony). 
 86.  Sklansky, supra note 58, at 52. 
 87.  Cf. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 61–65 (1980) 
(observing that, in the legal context, “[r]ational argument is . . . comprehended and carried out 
in terms of war”).  
 88.  See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017–19, 1021 (1988) (characterizing the right to face-
to-face confrontation as the “irreducible literal meaning of the [Confrontation] Clause” and 
finding a violation of that right when child witnesses who had been victims of sexual assault 
testified from behind a screen). 
 89.  438 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
 90.  Id. at 1313 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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values. The ideal of confrontation is to subject evidence “to a scrutiny 
or analysis calculated to discover and expose in detail its possible 
weaknesses, and thus to enable the tribunal to estimate it at no more 
than its actual value.”91 Evaluating statements according to the 
potential for assessing evidentiary worth in court would be at least as 
consistent as the “primary purpose” test. That test “has made it 
significantly more difficult to convict the guilty, without improving the 
chances of vindicating the innocent.”92 Before deciding whether 
confrontation must occur, the Court might consider whether it can 
accomplish anything, and what shape it could take. 
To be sure, any such inquiry recalls the reliability framework, and 
the Crawford majority has resisted an express turn back to reliability. 
There is a difference, however, between asking whether a statement’s 
reliability has been established through means other than 
confrontation—as in the Roberts-like analysis that Justice Scalia 
expressly rejected in Crawford93—and asking whether cross 
examination itself will contribute to reliability. Take, for example, an 
illustration that the Bryant case provides. The statement in question 
was the victim’s identification of his assailant. Focusing on the content 
of the statement, rather than the question whether it “shares key 
characteristics with trial testimony,” the statement is testimonial in the 
sense that it transmits “information for use in prosecution.”94 The 
victim, Anthony Covington, had been buying cocaine from Bryant for 
more than three years and had recently used cocaine when he died.95 
Although he named the perpetrator, it is unlikely that Covington 
actually saw him because the bullet passed through the closed 
backdoor of Bryant’s house.96 Furthermore, Covington identified the 
shooter by his voice, but gave law enforcement a physical description 
 
 91.  WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS, supra note 69, at § 1360 at 1; see also Kentucky v. 
Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 737 (1987) (cross examination is a “‘functional’ right designed to promote 
reliability in the truth-finding functions of a criminal trial”). 
 92.  Donald A. Dripps, Controlling the Damage Done by Crawford v. Washington: Three 
Consecutive Proposals, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521, 535 (2010); see also Tom Lininger, 
Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 749–50 (2005) (stating that after 
Crawford, hundreds of domestic violence cases were dismissed or lost at trial because of 
evidentiary problems with prior statements by recanting witnesses). 
 93.  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (“Dispensing with confrontation 
because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with a jury trial because the 
defendant is obviously guilty.”). 
 94.  See Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of Testimonial, 71 BROOK. L. 
REV. 241, 248, 251 (2005). 
 95.  People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d 65, 67 (Mich. 2009), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).  
 96.  Id. 
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that did not match Bryant’s.97 Whether he could have testified 
coherently and consistently under cross examination would provide 
some answers to obvious questions about accuracy.98 
A content-driven evaluation of statements like these does not turn 
on fit with the hearsay exceptions, and it also has the potential to 
achieve confrontation’s broader goals. Although the Court has at 
times disavowed any interest in whether cross examination “would 
actually serve a useful purpose,”99 some decisions do contemplate the 
likely effectiveness of cross examination.100 That focus, moreover, 
accords with Justice Scalia’s reasoning that Covington’s statement 
warranted confrontation because the exchange with police officers 
conveyed the same information that would have emerged from a 
“routine direct examination” at trial.101 If the primary concern of the 
Confrontation Clause is to prevent potential government 
manipulation,102 then the susceptibility of a statement to cross 
examination—in terms of its centrality to the prosecution’s case and 
the likelihood that questioning will reveal the involvement of 
government officers in its production—ought to be another relevant 
factor. 
Increased accounting for the capacity of cross examination also 
sheds light on questions about its adequacy. Appearance in the 
courtroom now amounts to both the minimal requirement for cross 
examination and a sufficiency standard. For twenty years, the Court’s 
decision in United States v. Owens103 has defined what constitutes an 
opportunity to cross examine a hearsay declarant who testifies at trial. 
 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  See Sanchirico, Cognitive Limitations, supra note 79, at 512–13 (concluding that the law 
exploits cognitive limitations of bad actors in ways that have significantly less impact on sincere 
actors); id. at 517 (“Unlike the fabricating witness, the sincere witness is aided in providing 
consistent testimony by the fact that what she is relating did actually happen, and is therefore in 
accord with the laws of physics and chemistry.”). 
 99.  Sklansky, supra note 58, at 53; see also United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 560 
(1988) (“[S]uccessful cross-examination is not the constitutional guarantee.”).  
 100.  See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 63 n.1 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 101.  Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1171 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 102.  See, e.g., Lisa Kern Griffin, Circling Around the Confrontation Clause: Redefined 
Reach But Not a Robust Right, 105 MICH. L. REV., FIRST IMPRESSIONS 16, 19, 21 (2006) (noting 
that Crawford and subsequent decisions presume that the goal of confrontation is to expose 
governmental coercion or manipulation in the production of testimony). But see Randolph N. 
Jonakait, The Right to Confrontation: Not a Mere Restraint on Government, 76 MINN. L. REV. 
615, 616 (1992) (preventing government abuse only partially animates the Confrontation 
Clause; it “operates not as a direct restraint on abusive governmental practices, but as a grant of 
positive rights to those charged with a crime”). 
 103.  484 U.S. 554 (1988). 
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In that case, the witness—a correctional officer who had been the 
victim of an assault that caused traumatic head injuries—had no 
memory of the underlying event but professed recollection of his 
prior identification of the assailant while he was in the hospital.104 The 
Court concluded that as long as a declarant has some memory of the 
circumstances surrounding the statement, that will suffice for 
purposes of confrontation.105 Courts have relied on Owens to drop the 
standard still lower, deciding that witnesses with no memory of prior 
conversations can be cross examined effectively because the jury can 
observe demeanor.106 Asserting a privilege, or otherwise refusing to 
testify altogether, does not afford an opportunity for cross 
examination,107 but willing submission to questioning, even if the 
proffered answers are entirely nonresponsive, is enough.108 
The foregoing discussion suggests, however, that the opportunity 
to cross examine must include questioning about the subject matter of 
the prior statement and not simply the making of the statement 
itself.109 Even if a jury observes the demeanor and capacity of a 
witness at trial, it may not accurately evaluate the reliability of the 
prior statement in question. Although the person in the witness chair 
and the out-of-court declarant are one and the same, intervening 
events and information may have effected changes in the witness. She 
is different, in potentially meaningful ways, from the witness who 
 
 104.  Id. at 556. 
 105.  See id. at 559 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]hat opportunity is not denied when a 
witness testifies as to his current belief but is unable to recollect the reason for that belief.”). 
 106.  See, e.g., State v. Holliday, 745 N.W.2d 556, 566 (Minn. 2008) (witness had memory loss 
attributed to drug use, but was nonetheless sufficiently present for cross examination); State v. 
Price, 146 P.3d 1183, 1192 (Wash. 2006) (child victim could not remember the incident or prior 
statements, but was held to be subject to cross examination because present in court).   
 107.  See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970) (to vindicate the right to cross 
examination, the inquiry must be sufficient to “afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for 
evaluating the truth of [a] prior statement”); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419–20 (1965) 
(defiantly silent witness cannot be confronted); United States v. Torrez-Ortega, 184 F.3d 1128, 
1132–33 (10th Cir. 1999) (“legal availability” of a hearsay declarant is insufficient); United 
States v. Spotted War Bonnet, 933 F.2d 1471, 1474 (8th Cir. 1991) (mere presence of a child 
witness does not satisfy the Confrontation Clause); United States v. DiCaro, 772 F.2d 1314, 
1322–25, 1324 n.6 (7th Cir. 1985) (a “total memory lapse” with respect to both the prior 
statement and its contents would preclude cross examination); Barksdale v. State, 453 S.E.2d 2, 
4 (Ga. 1995) (a witness who appeared in the courtroom but flatly refused to testify was not 
subject to cross examination). 
 108.  See, e.g., United States v. Keeter, 130 F.3d 297, 302 (7th Cir. 1997) (even feigned 
amnesia is not an impediment to adequate cross examination). 
 109.  See, e.g., State v. Canady, 911 P.2d 104, 115–16, 116 n.14 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996) (a 
witness “should be subject to cross examination about the subject matter of the prior statement” 
and should “be capable of testifying substantively about the event” to ensure that the statement 
is trustworthy).  
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made the earlier statement. And only when she recalls both the 
underlying past events, and the circumstances of speaking about them 
before, can the jury assess the inconsistencies and inaccuracies that 
might signal error and falsehood. 
This conception of confrontation not only increases the likelihood 
of vindicating the right, but also addresses some situations in which 
confusion about the meaning of “testimonial” has had unintended 
consequences for the integrity of the evidence.110 In certain cases, the 
prior statement may be considered the superior evidence. Particularly 
in the domestic violence context, the witness who appeared before the 
grand jury is often preferable, in terms of credibility, to the one 
refusing to testify in court. The witness, after all, is often just a prop 
during cross examination, with the examining lawyer providing most 
of the content. Indeed, various researchers have documented a truth-
hindering effect of vigorous cross examination,111 particularly with 
regard to the testimony of vulnerable witnesses.112 Jurors may be 
better positioned to appraise the out-of-court statement because 
there is a higher accuracy rate for deception detection with respect to 
unprepared statements and unrehearsed testimony.113 As for the jury’s 
ability to assess potential manipulation by interrogators, subsequent 
cross examination may also run a distant second place to verbatim 
recordings of the original exchange between government agents and 
potential witnesses.114 Further, an understanding of the limitations of 
physical presence opens up the possibility that video uplinks, satellite 
testimony, or closed-circuit questioning could supply meaningful 
confrontation. In cases that feature traumatized witnesses, substitute 
cross examination may offer the only possibility for confrontation.115 
 
 110.  See Sklansky, supra note 58, at 58–59 (“Even when a conviction can be secured without 
use of the victim’s statements, but especially when it cannot, refusing to allow the jury to hear 
the victim’s own words can erode the ‘moral credibility’ of the criminal justice system.”). 
 111.  See, e.g., Tim Valentine & Katie Maras, The Effect of Cross-Examination on the 
Accuracy of Adult Eyewitness Testimony, 25 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 554 (2011). 
 112.  See, e.g., Rachel Zajac & Harlene Hayne, I Don’t Think That’s What Really Happened: 
The Effect of Cross-Examination on the Accuracy of Children’s Reports, 9 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL. APPLIED 187, 193 (2003). 
 113.  See Charles F. Bond, Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo, Accuracy of Deception Judgments, 10 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 214, 227 (2006) (summarizing findings that listeners 
“achieve higher lie-truth detection accuracy when judging unplanned rather than planned 
messages”). 
 114.  Cf. Simon, supra note 82, at 182 (“Factfinders would gain much by being able to 
compare witnesses’ courtroom testimony with the exact statements they initially gave the 
police.”). 
 115.  See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990) (holding that two-way closed-circuit 
video cross examination satisfied the right to confrontation because reliability was assured by 
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In others, the hearsay in question—if it takes a form such as a 
recorded deposition—affords a better opportunity to review for 
accuracy, consistency, and the suggestiveness or manipulability of the 
initial questioning.116 
Finally, the Court continues to face questions about sufficient 
confrontation of expert forensic testimony. Many potential witnesses 
have contact with the samples submitted for forensic testing, and the 
Court has been assessing case-by-case which of those witnesses must 
be available for cross examination. In June 2011, the Court granted 
certiorari in Williams v. Illinois,117 which raises the issue of whether an 
expert witness can rely on a nontestifying declarant’s hearsay 
statements about the results of DNA testing.118 That hearsay can be 
imported into an expert opinion pursuant to the rules of evidence, so 
long as it is a statement on which experts ordinarily would rely, and 
the court deems that reliance reasonable.119 Demonstrating reliability 
within the meaning of the hearsay rules, however, does not fully 
address the constitutional concern. A content-driven assessment as to 
whether the absent analyst could reveal sources of bias and error 
under cross examination might help determine when confronting a 
surrogate expert is an adequate test of reliability.120 
V. CONCLUSION 
This brief contribution suggests that uncoupling confrontation 
from reliability has done little to clarify the scope of the confrontation 
right because the two concepts are inextricably intertwined. A clearer 
understanding of what cross examination means and does could help 
sort those statements that serve as substitutes for in-court testimony, 
 
the oath and the opportunity to observe the questioning, and the procedure avoided trauma to 
the witness); see also, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974) (confrontation “means 
more than being allowed to confront the witness physically”). 
 116.  The limited utility of cross examination may also point to a broader meaning of 
confrontation, including access to evidence and expertise. See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 58, at 7 
(“[T]he kind of ‘confrontation’ a criminal defendant needs and deserves may in many cases have 
little to do with excluding hearsay evidence—or, for that matter, with sitting in court and 
watching a witness testify, on direct and then on cross-examination.”). 
 117.  People v. Williams, 939 N.E.2d 268, 278 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (U.S. 
June 28, 2011) (No. 10-8505). 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  See FED. R. EVID. 703. 
 120.  See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence and the Confrontation Clause After 
Crawford v. Washington, 15 J. L. & POL’Y 791, 854–55 (2007) (surrogate testimony by qualified 
experts might be permissible where the original analyst is unavailable, the original testing was 
well documented, and retesting is not feasible). 
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and therefore merit in-court scrutiny. It might also lead to more 
comprehensive standards for the opportunity to cross examine where 
it is required, and recognition that some alternatives to in-court 
testimony can vindicate the confrontation right. 
 
